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The Consumer on the Home Front  
*Second World War Civilian  
Consumption in Comparative Perspective*

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A Consumer Society Shaped by War:  
The German Experience 1935–1955

UWE SPIEKERMANN

The war on the home fronts began long before Italian, Japanese, and German forces unleashed violence on their neighbouring countries. Individual elements of the German rationing system can be traced to 1934–5 and were based on intense discussions about the failure of efforts during the First World War. As a result, rationing began even before German troops invaded Poland. The home front was organized in accordance with a racial hierarchy. Combat capability, work efficiency, biological reproduction, and racial virtue were key considerations in decisions about distributing consumer goods during the war. Soldiers and men doing hard labour, women of childbearing age, and ‘Aryan’ children were given preferential treatment. It is often overlooked, however, that Germany’s war society was intended to anticipate a postwar ‘Aryan’ consumer society: ‘What tasted good to the soldier during the war will be adopted by the citizen in peacetime.’<sup>1</sup>

From 1935, professionals in the agricultural and food industries began to improve military food, then institutional feeding, and, finally, consumer goods. Germany’s military began the Second World War with a wide assortment of more than 150 new food products. Officials recognized the importance of vitamins and minerals, and of tasty, ready-to-eat dishes; they developed new packaging and used domestic raw materials. Based on detailed findings from the new science of bromatology, the National Socialist regime trained approximately 250,000 cooks and fed up to one-third of the population in canteens, camps, and communal feeding centres. These changes were the result not only of enormous research efforts—up to 50 per

<sup>1</sup> Hans Georg Riese, ‘Zusammenarbeit zwischen Wehrmacht und Industrie in Bezug auf die Volksernährung’, in *Erste Arbeitstagung des Instituts für Lebensmittelforschung* (n.p., 1942), manuscript, 7–9, at 8.

cent of public research funds went to the food sector—but also of the close co-operation of the Wehrmacht, the state, and National Socialist organizations with food manufacturers and retailers.

Against this background, this essay will analyse Germany's changing food market in three steps. First, it will look at how Wehrmacht foods were already promoted as beacons of the future for Germans during the war. Second, it will analyse how products developed for the Wehrmacht became consumer goods for the mass market during the years of the 'economic miracle'. Third, the essay will examine how numerous businesses drew on the Wehrmacht's research and development efforts to produce successful processed food brands.

*New Products for the 'Aryan' Race: Military Food  
as an Anticipation of Postwar Mass Markets*

Those provisioning the Wehrmacht were interested in convenient prepared food products with long shelf-lives and a high concentration of nutrients. Although this goal was in line with some research and product development in the Imperial German army, it received its most important boost during the Weimar period, both from discussions in the nutritional and agricultural sciences and from changes in the production of civilian food products. Soldiers were consumers in uniform. Military planners adopted changes in the knowledge that the development of certain substances and products was already underway. At the same time, however, their research and development capacity encouraged this knowledge to move out of the home and replace subjective with objective knowledge. As one observer proudly noted in 1941:

It is remarkable how the many kitchen preparations that used to be produced in households small and large are now industrial products in the form of primary and secondary goods. Substances and materials earlier judged to be waste are now usable raw materials; new kinds of food have come into being and substitute substances and materials have come into their own.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ernst Merres, 'Die Lieferungs- und Abnahme-Bedingungen der Heeresverwaltung für Lebensmittel', in Ernst Pieszczyk and Wilhelm Ziegelmayer (eds.), *1. Tagungsbericht der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ernährung der Wehrmacht* (Dresden, 1942), 303–8, at 303. Photographs of ready-to-eat and ready-to-heat products can be found in Wilhelm Ziegelmayer, 'Verpflegungs- und Kältetechnik', in Walther Kittel, Walther Schreiber, and Wilhelm Ziegelmayer (eds.), *Soldatenernährung und Gemeinschaftsverpflegung* (Dresden, 1939), 112–333, esp. 252.

Male-connoted knowledge about the structures of food and changes in foods created a new world of processed food that could incorporate efficiency and rationality, first into Wehrmacht cooking, then into everyday cooking mainly by women. Military food was the everyday food of the future. It would liberate German women from the drudgery of food preparation and make them available to render other services to their husbands and the German people. At the same time, the nutrient paradigm that had been woven into the new products and routine practices of the large-scale kitchen and production facilities helped to produce what experts considered to be a rationalized world. Or, in the words of Wilhelm Ziegelmayr, director of the Institute for Cooking Science and leading figure in the field of army nutrition:

Probably no one else has had more opportunity to work with the food industry's many branches over such a long period in order to develop new products, build hundreds of factories in Germany and Europe in co-operation with this industry, and above all observe how the food industry has constantly monitored nutritional problems, recognizing their importance and dealing with the science of calories, minerals, and vitamins.<sup>3</sup>

Military planners' emphasis on everyday food was reflected in the public presentation of Wehrmacht rations. They were introduced to Adolf Hitler and the German public in May 1939.<sup>4</sup> The rapid victory against Poland's armed forces was followed by a communications offensive that celebrated knowledge-based innovations while leaving no doubt about their superior suitability for everyday use. In fact, presentations to foreign military attachés, documentaries, newsreels, a special military rations exhibit at the Leipzig Fair, and the dual military and civilian use of the new products made possible the everyday participation of Germany's population in the Wehrmacht's victories.<sup>5</sup> Not everything was available, but the public had at least an idea about the new products.

<sup>3</sup> Wilhelm Ziegelmayr, 'Die Lebensmittelindustrie als Großküche in der Volksernährung', *Volksernährung und Kochwissenschaft*, 19 (1944), 3–5, at 3.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Ziegelmayr, 'Der Führer läßt sich die Verpflegung der Festungstruppen vorführen', *Zeitschrift für Heeresverwaltung*, 5 (1939), 212–14.

<sup>5</sup> Wilhelm Ziegelmayr, 'Offiziere fremder Mächte an der deutschen Feldküche', *Zeitschrift für Heeresverpflegung*, 5 (1940), 45–7; Höhne, 'Ein Verpflegungsfilm entsteht', *ibid.* 74–9; Schönauer, 'Heeres-Verpflegungsschau auf der Leipziger Messe', *ibid.* 188; 'Vom Heeresverpflegungsamt zur Feldküche', *Die Rundschau*, 37 (1940), 340–1. The Wehrmacht was also promoted as a teacher in food advertising, especially in a campaign for Knäcke crispbread. See e.g. *Der Vierjahresplan*, 6 (1939), 408.

The high point—and turning point—in this development was reached at the end of 1941, when restaurants were supposed to prepare military field rations for their customers twice a week. In this way, the propaganda image of Wehrmacht rations was used to familiarize civilian cooks with the army field cookbook and save meat.<sup>6</sup>

The popularization of the new convenience and substitute products did not begin suddenly with the war, however, but formed part of a comprehensive strategy to hold up Wehrmacht rations as a model that was paving the way for popular consumption and public health. The goals were ‘to make our national body healthy and to create a physically and mentally fit worker’.<sup>7</sup> While the Imperial German army had focused on filling rations with above-average amounts of meat, the Wehrmacht included bread, potatoes, vegetables, fish, dried unripe spelt (*Grünkern*), yeast extract, and potato starch. If military doctors and food planners still wanted to debate the value of the new nutritional science, propaganda made the debate look as if it had already been decided by the late 1930s. Wehrmacht rations were presented as a successful compromise between nutritional reform and nutritional science.<sup>8</sup> The resulting amalgam of instinct, reason, praxis, and theory distinguished German developments from those in the other armies. Finally, the long-term prospect of a civilian market required special efforts to achieve good quality, a nutritional profile that was comparable to fresh foods, and a higher consumption value.<sup>9</sup> In fact, consumers repeatedly appeared as a relevant discursive factor. It was necessary to persuade them and keep their minds on the prospect of an improved world of goods after the war’s successful end.<sup>10</sup> The German hunger years of 1944 to 1947

<sup>6</sup> Max Winckel, ‘Das Feldküchengericht’, *Zeitschrift für Volksernährung*, 17 (1942), 27. The maximum amount of meat was 50 grams per dish. As compensation, the calorific value was higher than usual. Cf. ‘Feldküchengerichte in der Gaststätte’, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 16 (1941–2), 556–7.

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Ziegelmeier, ‘Die Wehrmacht als Erzieher zur richtigen Verbrauchlenkung und gesunden Ernährung’, *Zeitschrift für Volksernährung*, 12 (1937), 13–15, at 15.

<sup>8</sup> Karl Paech, ‘Die Bedeutung der Gefrierkonserven von Obst und Gemüse für die Volksernährung’, *Die Umschau*, 44 (1940), 275–8, at 275. See also Ernst Pieszczyk, ‘Neuzeitliche Gedanken auf dem Gebiete der Verpflegung’, *Zeitschrift für die Heeresverwaltung*, 5 (1940), 29–31, esp. 29; Fritz Krüger, ‘Auf alten und auf neuen Wegen’, *Zeitschrift für Volksernährung*, 16 (1941), 48–9, at 49.

<sup>9</sup> Ernst Pieszczyk, ‘Lebensmittelforschung bei der Wehrmacht’, in *Erste Arbeitstagung des Instituts für Lebensmittelforschung* (n.p., 1942), 3–4, at 4. See also ‘Schutz dem Neuling’, *Der Vertrauensrat*, 8 (1941), 23.

<sup>10</sup> Heinrich Fincke, ‘Über allgemeinen Inhalt, Grundgedanken und Voraussetzungen

helped to establish a high-value image. For prisoners of war and the 'calorifically barren period' up to 1948,<sup>11</sup> real experiences and dreams of consumption fused into an image of good products that food producers could draw on in the new German states.

*Converting War Developments into Mass Market Brands*

Three examples will be presented in tracing the path of such brand-name goods into the mass market during the years of the 'economic miracle'. The first relates to a well-known product that featured in popular culture. When film director Wolfgang Staudte critically examined the general suppression of the Nazi era and the continuity of functional élites in his 1959 film *Rosen für den Staatsanwalt* [*Roses for the Prosecutor*], he used a popular food to capture the discrepancy between the state's actions and its norms. Lance corporal Kleinschmidt bought two cans of Scho-Ka-Kola on the black market and was sentenced to death, although he managed to get away, encountering his would-be murderer after the war. Scho-Ka-Kola, a caffeinated bitter chocolate produced as an energy food, came onto the market in 1935. By 1959 it was a popular brand-name product that was recognizable to more than 80 per cent of West Germans up to the early 1970s. This consumer item, which appeared repeatedly in dream sequences in the film, was perfectly suited to translating the arbitrary actions of the National Socialist judge into clearly understandable and humiliating imagery. Scho-Ka-Kola also stood for a growing number of similar chocolate products whose origins went back to the 1870s. The improved supply situation for raw materials from the early 1950s allowed many small and medium-sized companies to offer caffeine-enriched chocolate.<sup>12</sup>

Advertising for these products employed physiological and nutritional arguments, focusing on the performance-enhancing and energizing effects of cocoa and caffeine.<sup>13</sup> In this way, the essence of military and National Socialist medicine was still present within the

unserer Lebensmittelgesetze und -Verordnungen sowie über die Beziehungen zur Ernährungslenkung', *Zeitschrift für Untersuchung der Lebensmittel*, 84 (1942), 1–15, esp. 13.

<sup>11</sup> Oskar Gluth, *Buch meiner Jugend: Erinnerungen eines Münchners* (Munich, 1949), 75. See also Vinzenz Erath, *Zwischen Staub und Sternen* (Stuttgart, 1969), passim, esp. 58.

<sup>12</sup> For an overview of the market see Karl Philippi, 'Über coffein- und lecithinhaltige Anregungsmittel', *Deutsche Lebensmittel-Rundschau*, 50 (1954), 92–4.

<sup>13</sup> A good example was Stollwerck's Cola Sport. See *Der Markenartikel*, 13 (1951), 246, 247.

advertised message, although its imagery and intended applications transferred the product into the civilian context of a liberal economic regime and consumption society. Sport and socio-economic competition moved into the foreground, while consumers' perceptions drew silently on their wartime experiences.

The same was true of the dextrose preparation Dextro-Energen, which was distributed in the form of a pressed cube in cellophane packaging by the Hamburg firm Deutsche Maizena-Werke AG, a US-dominated company. Conceptually, it grew out of debates about nutritionally balanced baby food and went back to Dextrum purum, available at chemists since 1927, and a strengthening substance called Dextropur. It derived from the product differentiation and market segmentation of corn starch products.<sup>14</sup> Dextro-Energen, which was also used at the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936, could be absorbed by the body immediately. The Wehrmacht used the sweet product as a compact special foodstuff and emergency ration.<sup>15</sup> During the war, supplies of this product were increasingly channelled to the Wehrmacht, and by 1942 it disappeared from shops.<sup>16</sup> After the war, production was resumed relatively quickly.<sup>17</sup>

Maizena linked its postwar advertising to the proven achievement profile of the National Socialist brand-name product, bringing it back to the civilian sector. Dextro-Energen variations enriched with cocoa or peppermint from the 1950s also underlined how powerful the image of the body as a nutrient-processing organic machine continued to be: the human being as a power station that converts energy into vigour. This ideological transformation illustrates the decontextualization that occurs with processed foods, allowing not just any, but certainly plural symbolic meanings that fundamentally break with the products' origins and traditions.

But not all Wehrmacht products enjoyed lasting success. This was especially true of by-products left over from food production, such as the whey that remained after making cheese—nowadays quite a successful product range in Germany. The product planning

<sup>14</sup> See 'Vom Mais und seiner Verwendung', *Die Volksernährung*, 4 (1929), 319–20; 'Mais und seine Verwendung', *Zeitschrift für Volksernährung*, 15 (1940), 133–6.

<sup>15</sup> *Militär-Wochenblatt*, 126 (1941/2), cols. 253–4.

<sup>16</sup> 'Erst die Wehrmacht, dann Du! Dextro-Energen', *Der Markenartikel*, 9 (1942), 119.

<sup>17</sup> *Kristall*, 16/3 (1961), 52; *Der Markenartikel*, 28 (1966), 411. For postwar developments see Corn Products Company, 'Produkte für jeden Kochtopf: Maizena und Knorr als europäische Umsatzsäulen. Aktive Expansionspolitik', *Der Volkswirt*, 22 (1968), no. 32, 38–9.

of a growing number of milk-processing companies with research and development capacities was largely influenced by the state long before the war. It aimed to avoid throwing away whey or using it as fodder by processing it instead. Casein, milk powder, and lactic-acid pastes were used in large-scale kitchens.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, whey drinks increasingly made their mark as beer substitutes. In 1943 one-tenth of more than 4 million tons of whey was processed in order to stabilize the Wehrmacht's protein provision.<sup>19</sup> One example of the many innovations was Lactrone, a drink created by the fermentation of whey with Kefir spores and the addition of flavouring and sweetening.<sup>20</sup> Since 1944 it had been produced in Nuremberg by a company founded for this purpose, Lactrone GmbH.<sup>21</sup> Milk products gained further importance after the war. In Franconia, a region with large processing plants, 55,000 metric tons of whey accumulated, of which 40 per cent was processed. Because of significantly reduced milk production, stocks of whey fell to about 42,000 metric tons in 1948, and 72 per cent of this whey was processed.<sup>22</sup> Doctors, nutrition planners, and dairy owners agreed: 'Whey belongs on people's tables.'<sup>23</sup>

Lactrone, which the Wehrmacht had used primarily as thickened (easily transportable) syrup, was part of this trend in the postwar period. Its product range of 'natural drinks'<sup>24</sup> was expanded to include concentrates, fizzy mineral water, and a hot drink. Further consumer goods based on the raw materials in Lactrone were also developed.<sup>25</sup> The reconstruction of the German milk industry, the

<sup>18</sup> See Max Erich Schulz, 'Neue Milcherzeugnisse im Rahmen der Kriegs-Ernährungswirtschaft', in *Erste Arbeitstagung des Instituts für Lebensmittelforschung* (Stuttgart, 1942), 15–16. For an overview of war research see Karl Heinz Meewes, Martin Seelemann, and Helmut Nottbohm, 'Milch', in Ernst Rodenwaldt (ed.), *Naturforschung und Medizin in Deutschland 1939–1946*, lxvi. *Hygiene*, pt. 1: *Allgemeine Hygiene* (Wiesbaden, 1948), 140–56.

<sup>19</sup> Willy Möbius, 'Molkereierzeugnisse', *Natur und Nahrung*, 3/1–2 (1949), 14–15, at 15.

<sup>20</sup> Georg Gernert, 'Molken-Verwertung' (Hildesheim, [1949]), 17–18.

<sup>21</sup> For the production process see Max Erich Schulz, 'Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Kefirpilz-Symbiose', *Die Milchwissenschaft*, 1 (1946), 19–26.

<sup>22</sup> These figures are from Moritz Hegg and Emil Merk, 'Die fränkische Milchwirtschaft nach dem Kriege', *Die Milchwissenschaft*, 4 (1949), 193–202, at 197–8. Parallel butter production decreased from more than 22,000 tons to almost 10,000 tons.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Riedel, 'Die Molkenverwertung', *Deutsche Lebensmittel-Rundschau*, 43 (1947), 121–3, at 122.

<sup>24</sup> As advertisements called them; see 'Lactrone', *Die Milchwissenschaft*, 2 (1947), issue 5, p. iv; *ibid.*, issue 8, p. iv.

<sup>25</sup> Karl Skramer, *Molkenverwertungsmöglichkeiten der Gegenwart in molkereieigener Zuständigkeit* (Hildesheim, 1947), 18. The nutrient paradigm was at work here. The working

production of beer to quality standards attained in peacetime, and the growing significance of artificial soft drinks and colas, however, led to a collapse in the market for Lactrone products. From now on, Lactrone was merely used as an ingredient in baby food and as a secondary product for pudding powder and spices.<sup>26</sup>

*Convenience Products, Pushed by the  
Wehrmacht: The Example of Potato Processing*

This transformation of a consumer product into an intermediate good illustrates in part the impact of the military's push for technological developments, something whose importance can hardly be overstated. These developments were resumed by 1948–9 in response to changed demand structures and raw material supplies. Potato processing offers an example of this transition.

Processing potatoes in the Weimar Reichswehr had mainly been about reducing weight and increasing shelf-life. The first talks between businesses, representatives of the potato industry, and the supreme army command took place in 1934 on the initiative of scientists and members of the potato industry. These talks led to the production of the first dehydrated potatoes in 1936.<sup>27</sup> This work raised questions about how to optimize the process, maintain quality, and utilize any waste, but the factories viewed it with scepticism because of high development costs.<sup>28</sup> At the heart of efforts to optimize the process was the vitamin content of dried potato products and the technology used to dehydrate them.<sup>29</sup> In any case, the new products were suitable for use in the kitchen.

principles entailed the 'isolation of individual components' of the milk, the 'enrichment of strengthening nutrients', 'combinations of active vegetable ingredients', and the 'transfer or separation of special nutrients into easily reabsorbed products': 'Heilstoffe aus Milch', *Die Milchwissenschaft*, 2 (1947), issue 11, p. iv.

<sup>26</sup> Heinrich Kirchmaier, Hans Zeisel, and Theodor Dimmling, 'Lactrone-Heilmilch bei Säuglingsdyspepsien und -toxikosen', *Zeitschrift für Kinderheilkunde*, 66 (1949), 612–19.

<sup>27</sup> H. Cronemeyer, 'Die Trocknung der Speisekartoffeln in Scheiben', *Vorratspflege und Lebensmittelforschung*, 4 (1941), 171–6, at 171.

<sup>28</sup> On the problems of quality see Waldemar Kröner, 'Physikalische und chemische Fragen bei der Herstellung von Trockenspeisekartoffeln', *Vorratspflege und Lebensmittelforschung*, 4 (1941), 176–83; on the co-operation between the supreme army command and food industry see Wilhelm Jany, *60 Jahre deutsche Kartoffeltrocknung* (Hildesheim, 1954), esp. 81.

<sup>29</sup> See Waldemar Kröner and Herbert Lamel, 'Zur Frage des Vitamin-C-Gehaltes von Trockenspeisekartoffeln', *Vitamine und Hormone*, 1 (1941), 282–91; Arthur Scheunert and Johannes Reschke, 'Über den Vitamin-C-Gehalt von Trockenkartoffeln im frischen

Dried potato slices could be made into stews and casseroles, fried potatoes, potato salad, potato fritters, and mashed potatoes.

Given the inadequate cooling technology of the time, these convenient features led to increased investment in dehydration technology.<sup>30</sup> The supreme army command awarded many research contracts to private companies with a view to producing dried products, especially in powder form. One of these contracts went to the Munich company Otto Eckart, which worked exclusively for the military after its foundation in 1932.<sup>31</sup> This company was a subsidiary of Johannes Eckart's canning factory, which had been founded in 1868. Eckart's factory had begun dehydrating potatoes in 1914, but gave this activity up after the First World War. In 1936 the Otto Eckart company went back into the dehydration business, and was soon led by the son of the company founder, Werner Eckart, who had practical experience as a cook in a *Norddeutscher Lloyd* kitchen. The research contract awarded to the company, promoted personally by Wilhelm Zieglmayer (mentioned above), did not result in industrialized goods for mass consumption during the war, but it provided the main impetus for Pfanni products, which have been sold since 1949.<sup>32</sup>

In the immediate postwar years, most West German potato-processing companies were converted to production for the needs of the civilian population, and more dried potatoes were imported, especially from the United States. Basic research that transcended individual branches of the food industry had resumed in 1946, incorporating British and American technology. Werner Eckart himself began with a soy-potato product that could be used to make potato fritters, but it went bad quickly and had to be pulled from the market.<sup>33</sup> Practical trials followed in his factory, which

und zubereiteten Zustand', *ibid.* 292–300; and Waldemar Kröner, 'Die Herstellung von Trockenspeisekartoffeln', in Helmut Schieferdecker (ed.), *Das Trocknen von Gemüse und Obst sowie die Herstellung von Trockenspeisekartoffeln*, 2nd edn. (Brunswick, 1942), 115–29.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Wilhelm Heupke, 'Ernährungsprobleme der Gegenwart', *Jahreskurse für ärztliche Fortbildung*, 34/3 (1943), 22–32, at 27.

<sup>31</sup> See also Volker Wörl, 'Pfanni-Knödel: Ein neuer Eßbegriff. Das unternehmerische Gespür der Familie Eckart', *Der Volkswirt*, 17 (1963), 505–6.

<sup>32</sup> Research promoted by the Wehrmacht led to the production, from 1943–4, of dried baking flakes in four baking facilities that used a patent from the Hungarian company Roswaenge-Holndonner. In addition to improved driers, the Berlin Institut für Stärkefabrikation analysed different types of plants to find out which kinds were best suited for drying. See Jany, *60 Jahre deutsche Kartoffeltrocknung*, 86–7.

<sup>33</sup> Helmut Alt, *Von Kartoffeln, Knödeln und Pfanni* (Munich, 1959), 40–1.

in 1949 led to a dried-food product made of dehydrated raw and cooked potatoes that could be used to make fritters or dumplings. Eckart was not the only company in the Federal Republic to offer such a mix at the time. The Vlinderco-Werke in Goch and the Brückner-Werke in Nortorf were already producing a dried mashed potato mix.<sup>34</sup> Pfanni's leading market role derived from a personnel-intensive sales strategy that relied mainly on sales representatives and cooking demonstrations.<sup>35</sup> This approach was necessary in order to explain how to prepare the product and its practical advantages while breaking the association between dried potatoes and times of crisis.<sup>36</sup> Advertisements drew on traditional images of women and aimed at a more convenient way of living.<sup>37</sup>

Intensive research and new processing technologies in the 1950s improved this nationally price-controlled and initially quite expensive product, making it cheaper.<sup>38</sup> In the 1960s it dominated the retail trade with almost no competition. Companies such as Maggi, Knoll, and Nähr-Engel managed to hold their ground only in large kitchen facilities. In 1962 more than 50 million packages of Pfanni were sold. Economies of scale afforded by mass production and rising potato prices made it possible 'to supply the housewife with food more cheaply than she could make it in her own kitchen'.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Jany, *60 Jahre deutsche Kartoffeltrocknung*, 95. In technological terms, Pfanni was behind British innovations, such as the spray-dried POM (Potatoes-One-Minute), whose production entailed spray-drying. Nonetheless, many marketing contributions refer to an obvious 'pioneer product', e.g. Gerhard Kitir, 'Die Pfanni-Produkt-Ränge mit beschreibenden Namen', in *Brand-News: Wie Namen zu Markennamen werden*, Spiegel book (Hamburg, 1988), 97–103, at 99. Such studies ignore the National Socialist prehistory of the product, clearly deceiving the reader. Along these lines see also 'Pfanni: Karriere mit der Knolle', in Ulrich Clef, *Die Ausgezeichneten: Die Unternehmenskarrieren der 30 Deutschen Marketing-Preisträger* (Unterföhring, 2003), 244–7. This is also true of *Ein Unternehmen für die Verbraucher: 30 Jahre Pfanni-Erzeugnisse, 70 Jahre Konsul Werner Eckart, 110 Jahre Konservenfabrik Johannes Eckart* (Bonn, 1979), esp. 9 and 11.

<sup>35</sup> On the patriarchal company world and its marketing see Helmut Schmidmeier, *Wir und Pfanni* (Munich, 1999).

<sup>36</sup> On this last point see Hans Wegner, 'Kartoffelpüreepulver und Kartoffelkloßmehl: Herstellung, Eigenschaften und Qualitätsanforderungen', *Deutsche Lebensmittel-Rundschau*, 52 (1956), 199–205, at 199.

<sup>37</sup> See the advertisements for Pfanni and Poffi in *Kristall*, 9 (1954), 1214; *Kristall*, 12 (1957), 779.

<sup>38</sup> On the research efforts that directly resemble the Wehrmacht's corresponding efforts see 'Die Qualität bei Kartoffel-Veredelungsprodukten', *Der Markenartikel*, 31 (1969), 251–3.

<sup>39</sup> Oskar Wortmann, 'Ernährungsindustrie im Spannungsfeld der nationalen und internationalen Marktdynamik', *Die Ernährungsindustrie*, 7 (1960), 304–7, at 305.

The Wehrmacht planners' long-term ideas about consumption were realized in the Federal Republic's mass market.

*Outlook*

The continuity of concepts of consumption from the Third Reich to the postwar era was not confined to the development of well-known stable foods and brands before and after 1945. Similar observations can be made in the even more complex fields of manufacturing methods, storage technologies, far-reaching changes in semi-finished goods, and the creation of a new learning base for the food industry. Research into these developments would reveal even closer entanglements between the wartime and the postwar period. Moreover, the history of postwar mass consumption is closely intertwined with changes and innovations during the Second World War and even the preceding period. The fashionable historiographical business of post-1945 narratives is therefore tentatively misleading and in many cases heroic—and often an unreflected part of a Cold War confrontation that ended a generation ago.

Finally, the term 'home fronts' should be understood as a cipher for looking more closely at the impact of war on people and economies. In Germany, we have the paradoxical situation that a 'home front' was established quite some time before the 'war' started, and that the postwar period was characterized by hunger, restriction, and regulation. The European war—and even more the world war—did not start in 1939 and did not end in 1945. Recognizing the weakness of some of our key terms for periodization and analysis can be an important step towards a more advanced history of modern consumption.

